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Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance:
How a Suppression Remedy Would
Change Computer Crime Law
ORIN

by
S. KERR*

Introduction
Consider a typical computer crime investigation. A computer
hacker hacks into the servers of an Internet commerce company
looking for credit card numbers to copy and sell.! The company
discovers the attack and contacts the FBI for assistance. The FBI
opens an investigation and focuses its efforts on attempting to trace
the evidence of the attack from the victim back to the hacker. The
government's strategy will be to follow the trail of "electronic bread
crumbs" that the attack may have left behind, such as connection logs
and stored files, until they can trace back the attack and identify the
wrongdoer. This process is highly regulated by federal electronic
surveillance statutes that require the government to obtain court
orders nearly every step of the way; the court orders compel the
owners of the ISPs and other servers that may have records relatinq
to the attack to divulge the information they have to the government.
Imagine that these methods prove successful, and provide
information pointing to the hacker. At this point, the FBI obtains a
search warrant authorizing law enforcement to search the hacker's
home and seize his computer. FBI agents execute the warrant, and a
search of the computer uncovers the stolen credit card numbers inside
it. The FBI agents arrest the hacker.
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Jim
Dempsey, John Podesta, Paul Schwartz and Peter Swire for commenting on an earlier
draft.
1. See e.g., Patrick Collinson, Cybercrime: Have Hackers Got Your Number?, THE
GUARDIAN (London), May 18, 2002, at P2; Thomas E. Weber, E-World: Credit Fraud
Online Hurts Merchants More Than Shoppers, WALL. ST. J. (Europe), Dec. 10, 2001, at 10;
Harvey Morris, Teenage HackerAdmits Fraud,FIN. TIMES (London), July 7, 2001, at 2.
2. See infra Part II.B.
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Now imagine you are the hacker's defense attorney. You believe
the government violated the rules that regulate criminal
investigations in the course of investigating your client, and you want
the trial court to suppress the evidence linking your client to the
evidence. But how? Your most obvious option will be to rely on the
Fourth Amendment's suppression remedy to challenge the search
warrant at your client's home and the seizure and subsequent search
of your client's computer. You can argue that the search warrant was
not based on probable cause, was unconstitutionally overbroad, or
that the search was executed in flagrant disregard of the warrant.3 If
you can overcome the formidable Leon good faith hurdle on review
of the warrant,' the Court may suppress the evidence and dismiss the
charges against your client. But if you want to challenge the
government's surveillance practices that led to the probable cause
supporting the warrant, you will find yourself out of luck. Even
assuming that law enforcement agents violated the statutory
surveillance laws in the course of obtaining their court orders and
compelling evidence from the ISPs, the government will argue that
the Court should not even entertain the challenge because the laws
lack a statutory suppression remedy.6 Regardless of whether the
government complied with the surveillance statutes, the government
wins.
And the government will be right. While very generous civil
remedies exist against violations of a maze of statutes that on paper
offer significant privacy protection for Internet users, the statutory
Internet surveillance laws lack a suppression remedy.7 A defendant
charged with a crime can sue the government for civil damages if the
FBI violates the surveillance laws to catch him, and can sue ISPs and
other third parties if they violated the surveillance laws as well, but he
cannot rely on those violations as a basis for suppression of the
evidence against him. While the telephone surveillance laws offer a
3. For a summary of the cases evaluating all three arguments in the context of search
warrant to search and seize computers, see COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP.
SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS ch. 2 (2002),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm

[hereinafter

CCIPS MANUAL].

4. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 54 S.W.2d 21, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (reversing
conviction of defendant for possession of child pornography obtained via the Internet on
the grounds that the search warrant executed at the defendant's home was not based on
probable cause).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1101-11 (D. Kan. 2000)
(declining to suppress evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2703 because Congress
did not include a statutory suppression remedy under the statute).
7. See infra Part II.B where the current remedies scheme is explained in depth.

April 2003]

SUPPRESSION REMEDY FOR COMPUTER CRIMES

807

suppression remedy for at least some violations, the Internet
surveillance laws do not.8 Faced with this reality, a defense attorney
is unlikely to raise statutory arguments in a motion to suppress.
Instead, she will base the challenge solely on the constitutionality of
the warrant executed at the defendant's house. The government's
compliance with the Internet surveillance laws will remain
unexamined.
This dynamic, repeated hundreds of times over, has had a
dramatic and unfortunate impact on the law of Internet surveillance
that has never before been acknowledged. Thanks to the absence of
an exclusionary rule but the presence of strong civil provisions, the
courts only rarely encounter challenges to Internet surveillance
practices-and when they do, the challenges tend to be in civil cases
between private parties that raise issues far removed from those that
animated Congress to pass the statutes. As a result, the courts have
not explained how the complex web of surveillance statutes apply in
routine criminal cases, but instead have interpreted those statutes in
unexpected civil contexts where the implications of the court's
decision for the bulk of criminal cases tends to be unknown to the
court and ignored by the parties. The dynamic has given the law of
Internet surveillance a decidedly quirky flavor. The law remains
unusually obscure, and the rare judicial decisions construing the
statutes tend to confuse the issues, not clarify them. Internet
surveillance law remains a fog, and the remedies Congress has chosen
deserve much of the blame.
This Article argues that Congress should restructure the
remedies scheme of Internet surveillance law by adding a statutory
suppression remedy for violations of the Internet surveillance
statutes. Such a change would benefit both civil libertarian and law
enforcement interests alike.
On the civil libertarian side, a
suppression remedy would considerably increase judicial scrutiny of
the government's Internet surveillance practices in criminal cases.
The resulting judicial opinions would clarify the rules that the
government must follow, serving the public interest of greater
transparency. Less obviously, the change could also benefit law
enforcement by altering the type and nature of the disputes over the
Internet surveillance laws that courts encounter. Prosecutors would
8. The statutory line is not technically between a telephone and the Internet, but
rather communications that contain the human voice and those that do not. Compare 18
U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. 2002) (defining wire communications), with id. § 2510(12)
(defining electronic communications). For the most part, this statutory distinction tracks
the difference between telephone and Internet communications. Telephone calls
ordinarily carry the human voice, and Internet communications do not, although there are
cases in which the opposite is true. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will refer to the
difference as one between Internet and telephone communications.
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have greater control over the types of cases the courts decided, enjoy
more sympathetic facts, and have a better opportunity to explain and
defend law enforcement interests before the courts. The statutory
law of Internet surveillance would become more like the Fourth
Amendment law: a source of vital and enforceable rights that every
criminal defendant can invoke, governed by relatively clear standards
that by and large respect law enforcement needs and attempt to strike
a balance between those needs and privacy interests.
Importantly, my argument bypasses the usual debate over the
merits of suppression remedies and the exclusionary rule. The usual
debate focuses on the enforceability of legal rules.

Is the threat of

losing important evidence needed to deter the police from violating
the law? This is an important debate, and I confess an attraction to
the exclusionary rule in part because it places the right incentives on

law enforcement to follow the rules."' In the specific context of
Internet surveillance law, however, the enforceability debate carries
less force given the reality of how Internet crime investigations
work." Unlike traditional criminal investigations, Internet crime
investigations are conducted pursuant to court orders via the
9. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-09 (discussing the debate over the scope of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule in terms of its deterrent effect); Devon W. Carbado,
(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1006, 1006-07 (2002) ("The most
commonly invoked rationale for the exclusionary rule is deterrence. The argument is that
police are less likely to engage in unconstitutional searches and seizures if they know that
evidence acquired in violation of a person's constitutional rights will be inadmissible at
trial."); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary
Rule: A New and Extensive EmpiricalStudy of the Exclusionary Rule and a Callfor a Civil
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1998); Myron
W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1019-22 (1987); William C.
Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule:
The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM. 311, 319-21
(1991); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in
Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968).
10. In my relatively brief time as a prosecutor, I noticed that agents and police officers
can occasionally see legal niceties as impediments to their efforts to protect public safety
by identifying and arresting criminals, leading to their convictions in court. When a
suppression remedy is in place, the lawyer's goal of following the law comes into
alignment with the police officer's goal of building a provable case against the suspect.
Following the law becomes the most effective way for a police officer to do his or her job.
11. For examples of how the enforceability debate has dominated discussions of
whether the Internet surveillance laws should include a statutory suppression remedy, see,
e.g., Michael S. Leib, E-mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic
Communication to Title Ill's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject A "Good
Faith" Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 418-19, 437-38 (1997); Peter J. Georgiton,
Note, The FBI's Carnivore: How FederalAgents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-Mail
And Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 1831, 1866 (2001)
("Without a suppression remedy, the FBI has no real incentive to ensure that they are
following the protections Congress established with Title III and the ECPA.").
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intermediaries of ISPs and other third parties, who demand court
orders from the government and typically make sure that the I's are
dotted and T's are crossed before they will comply with them. 2
Further, for a range of reasons, Internet crime investigations are
mostly conducted by federal investigators,13 who are carefully trained
and closely watched by the federal prosecutors who must sign the
In this environment, traditional
applications for court orders.'
concerns about rogue police officers may retain their rhetorical force,
but fortunately seem less attuned to the mechanics of Internet crime
investigations than those of traditional criminal investigations. The
existence of a suppression remedy may have a marginal effect on the
government's incentives to comply withthe statutory scheme, but that
effect is likely to be quite small.
I think the real issue raised by remedies for violations of Internet
surveillance laws relates less to the enforcement of the law than its
clarity and shape. A suppression remedy would change Internet
surveillance law considerably. It would clarify the law, inform the
public, and influence the law's doctrinal development. I will develop
this argument in the following three sections. Section I, explains the
importance of the statutory remedy Congress chooses, and why
statutory rather than constitutional rights and remedies play a
primary role in regulating Internet crime investigations. Section II
argues that the current remedies scheme has impeded the natural
development of Internet surveillance law. As a direct result of the

12. See How Far Will the Feds Go to Push Favorable Surveillance Laws?, ECommerce Law Week (Sept. 7, 2002), at http://www.steptoe.com (advising ISPs to
"undertake an independent evaluation of the order's lawfulness rather than simply relying
on DOJ's interpretation of the law" when confronted with a court order to conduct
surveillance).
13. Computer crimes tend to be investigated at the federal level rather than the state
level for a host of reasons. First, the national and even international nature of the
evidence collection process poses special challenges for states. Second, federal law creates
a floor but not a ceiling for state Internet surveillance practices, and both imposes special
burdens on state surveillance laws and allows the states to impose even greater burdens.
Third, state surveillance practices can be burdened relative to federal practices by
expansive interpretations of state equivalents of the Fourth Amendment, which govern
state agents but not federal agents.

See generally ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME:

CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 10 (forthcoming 2005).

14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (1993) (requiring that an application for a Wiretap Order
to intercept electronic communications must be signed by an "attorney for the

Government"); id. § 3122(a)(1) (requiring that an application for a Pen Register Order
must be signed by an "attorney for the Government"). In the case of a court order to
compel an ISP to disclose stored evidence under the Stored Communications Act pursuant
to id. § 2703(d) (Supp. 2002), a "government entity" must apply for the order, but the
application need not be signed by an attorney. Id. In most cases, however, the
applications are in fact signed by a government attorney such as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney involved in the investigation.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

remedies scheme Congress has chosen, courts have not answered how
the statutes apply to routine criminal cases but instead have applied
the statutes in quirky civil contexts which have led to more confusion,
rather than less. Finally, in Section III, I propose that Congress
should add a statutory suppression remedy to the Internet
surveillance statutes, and offer reasons why both civil liberties groups
and law enforcement should support the proposal.
I. The Rights and Remedies of Internet Surveillance Law
To understand the importance of statutory remedies within
Internet surveillance law, it is essential to understand the differences
between the laws that regulate criminal investigations in the physical
world and the laws that regulate Internet crime investigations. In the
former, the Fourth Amendment acts as the primary guide; in the
latter, statutory surveillance laws do. To a large extent, Internet
surveillance law is statutory law, and the remedies of Internet
surveillance law are statutory remedies. This section begins by
explaining the traditional rules and remedies that govern physicalworld crime investigations and next explains why those same rules
generally do not govern Internet crime investigations. The section
then contrasts the traditional constitutional regime with the statutory
rules that govern Internet crime investigations, focusing on the
significant differences between the suppression remedies traditionally
available in constitutional cases and the civil remedies currently
available in the statutory context of Internet surveillance.
A. The Traditional Framework: Constitutional Protections and
Exclusionary Remedies
In the physical world, the Fourth Amendment acts as the
primary regulator of law enforcement conduct in the course of
criminal investigations. Fourth Amendment rules apply to federal,
state, and local investigators, 5 and tell the police what they can and
cannot do as they gather evidence of crime. Although the Fourth
Amendment insists on an overarching constitutional goal of
reasonableness,' 6 the Supreme Court has enforced that goal by
creating highly specific rules that govern in remarkable detail what
the police can do, when, and under what circumstances.
15. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
16. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment's "central requirement is one of reasonableness").
17. See id. ("In order to enforce that requirement [of reasonableness], this Court has
interpreted the Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions designed to control
); Ronald J. Allen. & Ross M. Rosenberg, The
conduct of law enforcement officers.
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To simplify dramatically, the Fourth Amendment allows law

enforcement to go freely into public spaces that are not protected by
a "reasonable expectation of privacy,"' 8 but generally requires a
search warrant or special factual circumstances for the government to
go into private spaces that are protected by a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 9 As a practical matter, this approach carves out private
spaces where law enforcement can't ordinarily go without a warrant,

and separates them from public spaces where it can. If government
surveillance does not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy,
law enforcement ordinarily remains free to conduct it. When
surveillance does implicate such privacy interests, the police may
need "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity to take certain
investigative steps," probable cause to take others,2' and generally
must obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate before
executing the most invasive forms of surveillance.22
The exclusionary rule provides the primary means of enforcing
the Fourth Amendment. If the police break the rules and violate a

defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in the course of an
investigation, the defendant can move for supression of the evidence
obtained,23 and any fruits following from it. Suppression is not an
automatic remedy if the police violate the Fourth Amendment.'

Courts will not suppress evidence obtained from a violation of the
rights of someone other than the defendant.26 The police can also use
evidence obtained from the execution of a defective search warrant if
they relied in good faith on the warrant.27 In most cases, however, a
court must suppress the evidence obtained in violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment's rights.
Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (allowing law enforcement to
pilot helicopter that allowed them to view the defendant's property and observe it from
public airspace without a warrant).
19. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002) (holding that absent exigent
circumstances, the police may not enter a suspect's home without his consent or the
consent of someone with common authority over the area entered).
20. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (reasonable suspicion needed to stop
a suspect for questioning).
21. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 660 (1979) (probable cause to
believe traffic violation occurred justifies decision to stop an automobile).
22. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (search warrant needed to
direct thermal imager in the direction of a suspect's home).
23. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
25. See supra notes 6-11 and associated text.
26. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,143 (1978).
27. See Leon. 468 U.S. at 905.
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Defendants also have civil remedies for Fourth Amendment
violations, although these remedies have played a decidedly
secondary role in the development of the Fourth Amendment. In a
federal investigation, a defendant can bring a Bivens action against
the government for money damages," and in a state investigation, a
defendant can sue the state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 Few criminal
defendants bother to sue, however. Unsurprisingly, most defendants
care more about staying out of jail than about bringing a lawsuit
against the government for money damages. As a result, the number
of Fourth Amendment decisions arising from motions to suppress
dwarfs the number arising from civil actions against the government.
B.

Internet Surveillance Law and the Shift from Constitutional to Statutory
Protections

The source of Internet surveillance law differs considerably from
that of traditional search and seizure law. In physical-world
investigations, the governing rules usually derive from the Fourth
Amendment. In the Internet context, however, the governing
standards of law are primarily statutory.0 This may change in the
future, as the law is uncertain; many basic questions about the scope
of constitutional protections remain. Today, however, it is fair to say
that Internet privacy is primarily statutory privacy, and the remedies
that govern Internet privacy are primarily statutory remedies.
To see why statutory rather than constitutional protections
provide the essential rules governing Internet surveillance law, it
helps to compare what the Fourth Amendment protects with how the
Internet works. Recall that the Fourth Amendment effectively carves
out private spaces where law enforcement can't ordinarily go without
a warrant and separates them from public spaces where it can. One
important corollary of this structure is that when a person sends out
property or information from her private space into a public space,
the exposure to the public space generally eliminates the Fourth
28. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Bureau of Fed. Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 388 (1971).
29. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
30. I develop this argument in Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PATRIOTAct: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607,627-30 (2003).
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Amendment protection. If you put your trash bags out on the public
street,31or leave your private documents in a public park,32 the police
can inspect them without any Fourth Amendment restrictions.
The Supreme Court's cases interpreting this so-called "disclosure
principle" have indicated that the principle is surprisingly broad. For
example, the exposure need not be to the public. Merely sharing the
information or property with another person allows the government
to go to that person to obtain it without Fourth Amendment
protection. If you tell a secret to your friend,33 or give a document to
your accountant,34 the Fourth Amendment will not offer protections
from police efforts to get the secret from your friend or the document
from your accountant. Even more broadly, the disclosure need not
be to a human being. In Smith v. Maryland,35 the Supreme Court
concluded that the same principle applies when a person enters
information into another person's machine. By telling the machine
your private information, the Supreme Court held, you relinquish an
expectation of privacy in the information ,ust as you would if you had
told your private information to a person.

Why does this matter to Internet surveillance?

It matters

because the basic design of the Internet harnesses the disclosure,
sharing, and exposure of information to many machines connected to

the network. The Internet seems almost custom-designed to frustrate
the Fourth
claims of broad Fourth Amendment protection:
Amendment does not protect information that has been disclosed to
third-parties, and the Internet works by disclosing information to
third-parties. Consider what happens when an Internet user sends an
e-mail. " By pressing "send" on the user's e-mail program, the user

sends the message to her ISP, disclosing it to the ISP, with
instructions to deliver it to the destination. The ISP computer looks
at the e-mail, copies it, and then sends a copy across the Internet
where it is seen by many other computers before it reaches the
recipient's ISP. The copy sits on the ISP's server until the recipient
requests the e-mail; at that point, the ISP runs off a copy and sends it

31. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
32. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1996).
33. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
34. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
35. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
36. See id. at 744-45 (viewing disclosure to a machine as identical to an analogous
disclosure to a person in the context of a pen register, and concluding that for reasons of
coherence 'the Court would not apply a separate rule simply because the company
"decided to automate").
37. See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 87 (2001).
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to the recipient.38 While the e-mail may seem like a postal mail, it is
sent more like a post card, exposed during the course of delivery.39
Does this mean that the Fourth Amendment offers no protection
to Internet communications? It's too early to tell. Courts may follow
the logic of this syllogism, or they may not. 40 However, courts have
already indicated that defendants do not retain Fourth Amendment
protection in non-content information such as basic subscriber
information.4' Courts have also declined to find Fourth Amendment

protection in the contents of computer usage in the few fairly specific
situations that have been litigated. 42 At least as of the time of this
writing, the answer to the question of how much privacy protection

the Fourth Amendment guarantees to Internet communications
appears to be "not much." And certainly not enough.
Fortunately, Congress understood these difficulties at a
remarkably early date, and passed legislation to protect Internet4
privacy long before most Americans had even heard of the Internet.
The important date is 1986, when Congress amended the 1968
Wiretap Act by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"). 44 ECPA created a comprehensive set of statutory
protections that give roughly the protections against Internet
surveillance that the Fourth Amendment might have protected absent

the disclosure principle. Although ECPA has been amended many
times since 1986, the 1986 Act set the basic framework of Internet
surveillance law: all subsequent changes have merely nibbled around
the edges of the law that Congress passed with tremendous foresight

back in 1986.

38. See id.
39. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETrY GOOD PRIVACY 8-9 (1995).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (assuming, but
not deciding, that the holder of a Yahoo! Internet account retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of files stored in the account, but noting the
uncertainty of whether in fact it does.). See also Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective
in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 57, 365-67 (2003) (discussing different ways in which courts
might approach whether the Fourth Amendment protects remotely stored computer files).
41. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no expectation of
privacy in non-content information disclosed to ISP); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
opinion); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000)
(unpublished opinion).
42. See Leis, 225 F.3d at 333; United States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Me. 2001);
United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000). But see United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
43. The word "Internet" was coined in 1982. Timeline: Evolution of the Internet,
Table 1, http://www.eatonhand.com/thues/wtable01.htm (last visited Feb. 2,2003).
44. Pub.L. 99-508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986)).
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The framework of electronic surveillance laws created by ECPA
consists of three statutes: the Wiretap Act,45 the Pen Register
statute,46 and the Stored Communications Act. 7 The Wiretap Act and
the Pen Register statute both regulate access to prospective, real-time
Internet communications. 4' The Wiretap Act regulates access to
"contents" of communications such as e-mails, and the Pen Register
statute regulates access to non-content information, "dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information," such as the originating e-mail
addresses in an e-mail inbox. Both the Wiretap Act and the Pen
Register operate in the same basic way. They each enact general
criminal prohibitions on both government and non-government
access to communications but permit a few specific exceptions to
allow such access.49 One of those exceptions allows the government
to obtain a court order to either access the communications directly
or order an ISP to access the communications on the government's
behalf.0 In the case of the Wiretap Act, the court order is quite
difficult to obtain. The government must obtain a "super warrant" to
access the actual contents of communications, which is the highest
threshold court order in American criminal law." In contrast, the Pen
Register order is quite easy for the government to obtain. To access
non-content information, the lawyer for the government must merely
apply to the court and certify that the information likely to be
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.52
While the Wiretap Act and Pen Register statute regulate access
to communications in transit, the Stored Communications Act
regulates government access to both the contents and non-contents of
stored communications:"
The Act works by regulating the
government's interactions with third-party providers such as ISPs and
other servers that store communications on behalf of its users and
subscribers. While the Fourth Amendment apparently places few if
any restrictions on government access to communications held by
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-22.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27.
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.
48. See CCIPS Manual, supra note 3 at ch. 4.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (Wiretap Act); id. § 3121 (Pen Register
statute).
50. See id. § 2516 (Wiretap Act); id. § 3123 (Pen Register statute).
51. See id. § 2518 (explaining steps the government must take to satisfy legal
requirements needed to obtain a Wiretap Order).
52. See id. § 3123 (explaining steps the government must make to satisfy legal
requirements needed to obtain a Pen Register Order).
53. Put another way, the Stored Communications Act regulates retrospective
surveillance, allowing the government to access communications that are already stored
and existing, rather than prospective surveillance of communications not yet sent. See
Kerr, supra note 30, at 616-18.
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ISPs, the Stored Communications Act does. The statute harnesses a
client/server model, and gives clients (described as "customer[s]" or
"subscriber[s]") rights in their records held by the server (the
"provider" of the "service" 54 ). Under the Act, the government must
obtain a subpoena to compel ISPs to divulge certain information;
must obtain a "specific and articulable facts" court order to compel
an ISP to divulge other information; and must obtain a probable
cause search warrant to compel an ISP to divulge the most private
information, such as the contents of unopened e-mails in a user's
inbox.5 The Act also places limits on the ability of ISPs to disclose
information relating to a user: while the Fourth Amendment places
no limits on such disclosure, the Stored Communications Act forbids
ISPs from disclosing information to the government except in specific
situations. 6
Taken together, these three statutes create a set of privacy
protections that is roughly analogous to the privacy protections that
the Fourth Amendment offers in the physical world. In some ways,
the privacy protections offered by the statutory rules exceed those
offered by constitutional standards;57 in other ways, the statutory
protections fall considerably short of the traditional rules. 8 But the
key point for our purposes is that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment has led Congress to enact Fourth
Amendment-like rules by statute. This means that when the
government violates the rules governing electronic surveillance, the
violations tend to be statutory, and the remedies are up to Congress,
rather than the Constitution.

54. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1993); id. § 2703. The terms "customer" and "subscriber" are
not defined by the statute.
55. See id. § 2703; CCIPS Manual, supra note 3, ch 3.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702; CCIPS Manual, supra note 3, ch 3.
57. For example, the statutes all offer protection against both government access and
access to information by private actors.
58. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) allows the government to obtain access to stored
opened e-mails without a search warrant. Focusing on these relative weaknesses in the
surveillance statutes, Professor Solove writes:
The current statutory regime that has attempted to fill the void created by the
judicial evisceration of the Fourth Amendment is inadequate because it results in
the de facto watering down of the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. As warrants supported by probable cause are replaced
by subpoenas and court orders supported by "articulable facts" that are
"relevant" to an investigation, the role of the judge in the process is diminished
to nothing more than a decorative seal of approval. In many circumstances,
neither court orders nor subpoenas are required.
Daniel Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1083,1150-51 (2002).
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C. The Current Remedies of Internet Surveillance Law
Statutory suppression remedies historically have been an
important part of the enforcement mechanisms of electronic
surveillance law.
From the 1930s until 1968, no telephone
wiretapping evidence was admissible in federal court. 9 Even today,
the fruits of unlawful telephone wiretapping ordinarily must be
suppressed as a matter of statutory law.' ° The statutory suppression
remedy applies only to Wiretap Act violations: voicemails obtained
in violation of the Stored Communications Act and non-content
information obtained in violation of the Pen Register statute will not
be suppressed as a matter of statutory law. 61
In the Internet context, however, none of the laws contain a
statutory suppression remedy, not even the Wiretap Act.62 In 1986,
when Congress passed ECPA, Congress agreed to accept Department
of Justice's ("DOJ") proposal to reject a statutory suppression for
Wiretap Act violations involving computer communications. 63 Little
is publicly known about the reasons behind DOJ's request (and
Congress's agreement) to exclude a statutory suppression remedy.'
In all likelihood, DOJ worried that a suppression remedy would
prove unduly harsh given the uncertain state of the law. Forcing the
DOJ to comply with the complex new laws was one thing; suppressing
evidence that the government collected in good faith under
interpretations of the law that courts later rejected was another.
Whatever the exact reason, DOJ's view prevailed and the law did not
include a suppression remedy.
Instead, Congress enacted a powerful set of civil remedies to
enforce the surveillance statutes. Under the Wiretap Act, any person
59. Wiretapping evidence was inadmissible in federal court under the
Communications Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 108-3 (1924) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(2003)), as first construed in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937). The
Supreme Court ruled that this exclusionary rule did not apply in state court in Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). However, in 1968, just two days before Congress passed
the modern Wiretap Act, the Supreme Court reversed itself and concluded that § 605 did
bar wiretapping evidence in state court as well. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386
(1968).
60. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a) (1993). However, the law as to when illegal
wiretapping actually leads to suppression is quite complicated.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (1993) (Stored Communications Act) ("The remedies and
sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for
nonconstitutional violations of this chapter."); United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314,
1320-21 (8th Cir.1995) (noting the absence of a statutory suppression remedy for the Pen
Register statute).
62. See United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2712(d) (Supp. 2002) (covering both the Stored Communications Act and Wiretap Act).
63. See Leib, supra note 11, at 409-11.
64. Michael Leib summarizes the horsetrading between Congress and the DOJ that
led to the compromise. Id. at 109-11.
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whose Internet communications are intercepted in violation of the
Act can recover actual or statutory damages (whichever is greater),
plus reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs," plus
punitive damages "in appropriate cases. 6 6 Persons aggrieved by
violations of the Stored Communications Act can recover actual or
statutory damages (whichever is greater), plus reasonable attorney's
fees and other litigation costs, 67 and punitive damages in the case of
willful or intentional violations.68 Congress believed that these
remedies were so important that it recently passed a second set of
civil remedies as part of the USA PATRIOT Act, specifically
allowing for suits against the federal government that contain69
unusually high statutory damages, plus reasonable litigation costs.
Oddly, Congress has failed to include an explicit civil remedy for
violations of the Pen Register statute. Whether the Pen Register
statute could support a private right of action is unclear; apparently
no such suit has ever been brought. Despite this apparent oversight,
taken as a whole the civil remedies offered by the Internet
The
surveillance statutes provide strong incentives to sue.
combination of statutory damages, attorney's fees, and even punitive
damages creates a considerable incentive for potential plaintiffs to
raise their claims in court.
The surveillance laws do offer other remedies beyond civil
remedies, but they are only rarely invoked. First, each of the statutes
includes at least some criminal prohibitions. Willful violations of the

65. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3) (1993) ("In an action under this section, appropriate relief
includes... a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.").
66. Id. § 2520(b)(2) ("In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes
damages under subsection (c) .... ").
If the person who engaged in that conduct has not previously been enjoined
under § 2511(5) and has not been found liable in a prior civil action under this
section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered
by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than
$500.
Id. § 2520(c)(1)(A).
67. Id. § 2707(b)(3) (Supp. 2002) ("In a civil action under this section, appropriate
relief includes ... a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.").
68. Id. § 2707(c).
The court may assess as damages in a civil action under this section the sum of
the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator
as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person entitled to recover
receive less than the sum of $1,000. If the violation is willful or intentional, the
court may assess punitive damages. In the case of a successful action to enforce
liability under this section, the court may assess the costs of the action, together
with reasonable attorney fees determined by the court.
Id.
69. See id. § 2712.
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Wiretap Act are felony crimes,7" albeit not ones that are likely to lead
to prison time under the federal sentencing guidelines." Violations of
the Pen Register statute are mere misdemeanor crimes, as are most

of the few criminal violations of the Stored Communications Act.73
Similarly, judicial or administrative findings that "serious questions"
exist as to whether a federal government employee willfully violated

the Wiretap Act or Stored Communications Act automatically trigger
a proceeding into whether disciplinary action is warranted. While
these different approaches may help bolster the enforceability of the
surveillance laws, they do not change the fact that the cases
construing the laws will most likely deal with civil remedies.
H. The "Fog" of Internet Surveillance Law and Its Origins in
the Current Remedies Scheme
This Section argues that the unusual statutory remedies scheme
of Internet surveillance law has had profound consequences for the

clarity and shape of Internet surveillance law. Thanks to the
remedies scheme, courts rarely encounter disputes involving the
Internet surveillance statutes, and when they do, the cases tend to be
civil disputes that have little to do with the core concerns of criminal
70. See id. § 2511 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (making willful interception of an oral, wire or
electronic communication a felony offense).
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2H3.1 (2000) (making a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 a base 9 offense under the federal sentencing guidelines).
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d) (Supp. 2003). ("Whoever knowingly violates [18 U.S.C. §
3121(a)] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both.").
73. Id. § 2701(b) states:
The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is(1) if the offense is committed for purposes of commercial advantage,
malicious destruction or damage, or private commercial gain(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both, in the case of a first offense under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than two years,
or both, for any subsequent offense under this subparagraph; and
(2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both, in any other case.
74. Id. § 2712(c).
If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States
or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter,
and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances
surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer
or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to
the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct
copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or
agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action
against the officer or employee is warranted.
Id. See also id. § 2520(f) (Wiretap Act); id. § 2707(d) (Stored Communications Act).
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investigations. The argument proceeds in three parts. First, the
absence of a suppression remedy has resulted in few legal opinions,
which has made the law unusually difficult to understand. Second,
the absence of decisions interpreting the statutes in routine criminal
cases has left many important questions unresolved. And third, the
available civil remedies have produced an unusual number of
influential opinions involving civil disputes far from the concerns that

motivated Congress to pass the statutes, in which the courts simply
get it wrong.
A.

The "Fog" of Internet Surveillance Law

The law of electronic surveillance is famously complex, if not
entirely impenetrable. Even before Congress added the Internet to
the surveillance laws in 1986, the Fifth Circuit described the Wiretap
Act as "a fog of inclusions and exclusions"'5 that frustrated the

judicial search for "lightning bolts of comprehension."''

6

The same

court has since explained that that "construction of the Wiretap Act is
fraught with trip wires,""'7 and in a case involving the intersection
between the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act, that

the law is "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity."' 8 The
Ninth Circuit has remarked that the Fifth Circuit's complaints "might

have put the matter too mildly," and agreed that the surveillance laws
involve

"a complex, often convoluted, area of the law."' 9 More

recently, the Ninth Circuit reversed its own panel decision applying
the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act to the Internet,

75. See Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J.).
76. Id. The court's entire comment was the following:
We might wish we had planted a powerful electronic bug in a Congressional
antechamber to garner every clue concerning Title III, for we are once again
faced with the troublesome task of an interstitial interpretation of an amorphous
Congressional enactment. Even a clear bright beam of statutory language can be
obscured by the mirror of Congressional intent. Here, we must divine the will of
Congress when all recorded signs point to less than full reflection. But, alas, we
lack any sophisticated sensor of Congressional whispers, and are remitted to our
more primitive tools. With them, we can only hope to measure Congress' general
clime. So we engage our wind vane and barometer and seek to measure the
direction of the Congressional vapors and the pressures fomenting them. Our
search for lightning bolts of comprehension traverses a fog of inclusions and
exclusions which obscures both the parties' burdens and the ultimate goal.
Id. See also Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Our analysis of
the two statutory provisions makes us confident of only one conclusion: the statute is not
a model of clarity.") (construing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2517 (1993 & Supp. 2002)).
77. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1542-43 (5th Cir. 1994).
78. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994).
79. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
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explaining in its latter opinion that Internet surveillance remained "a
confusing and uncertain area of the law."'
The complexity of the surveillance laws owes in part to their
history. The statutory language and structure reflect the technology
of the eras in which Congress enacted the different pieces of the
statutory puzzle. The 1968 Wiretap Act reflects the technology and
practices of the 1950s and 1960s telephone networks; the 1986 Stored
Communications Act uses early 1980s terminology about the Internet
and computer networks. This disparity in approaches does not
necessarily mean that the law is outdated. Once understood, the laws
reveal a surprisingly workable, if not masterful, framework. Many
hours of study unearth a surprising amount of thought and wisdom in
the statutory text.
But before attaining mastery of the materials, a student must
slowly work her way through remarkably difficult statutory language.
What on earth is a "pen register,, 81 a student might wonder, or a "trap
and trace device" 8 ? What's the difference between a "remote
80. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth
Circuit blamed this confusion on Congress's failure to update the law to take into account
modern technologies. In particular, the court complained that:
the difficulty [in construing the surveillance statutes] is compounded by the fact
that the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World
Wide Web. As a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address
modern forms of communication ....Courts have struggled to analyze problems
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework,
often with unsatisfying results.
Id. While the court is correct that the law remains complex, the court is wrong that the
reason for the complexity lies in Congress' failure to account for the Internet. ECPA was
enacted in order to protect the privacy of Internet communications. The idea that ECPA
was written before the Internet was invented is quite preposterous (although, in fairness,
the court's claim that ECPA was written before the World Wide Web is correct).
81. "Pen register" is defined as:
a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire
or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term
does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire
or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to
billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost
accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. 2002).
82. "Trap and trace device" is defined as:
a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication.
Id. § 3127(4).
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computing service,"83 and an "electronic communication service""?
What is the difference between
a "wire communication" 5 and an
"electronic communication" 6 ? Why does the Wiretap Act only
prohibit interception of communications using a "device,"8'7 but then
exempt from the definition of devices any equipment provided by a
provider to a user and used by the user "in the ordinary course of its
business"'? Why does the statutory definition of "electronic storage"
exclude most communications that are stored electronically?89

83. "Remote computing service" is defined as "the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system .. " Id.
§ 2711(2).
84. "Electronic communication system" is defined as "any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." Id.
§ 2510(15) (1993).
85. "Wire communication" is defined as:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the
use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.
Id. § 2510(1) (Supp. 2002).
86. "Electronic communication" is defined as:
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce, but does not include-(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any
communication made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communication
from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or (D) electronic
funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.
Id. § 2510(12)
87. Id. § 2511 (1993 & Supp. 2003) prohibits interceptions, and id. § 2510(4) defines
"intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device .. "
88."[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other
than(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of
its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or
(ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in
the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement
officer in the ordinary course of his duties.
Id. § 2510(5)(a).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
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While all of these questions have answers if you know where to
look,' few if any of those answers can be found in published judicial
decisions. Judicial decisions often guide the way through complex
areas of law: a well reasoned and clear opinion can explain in basic
language what a complex statute does and how it works. Yet despite
the fact that ECPA was passed over fifteen years ago, very few
judicial opinions have interpreted the laws that ECPA created. A
student wishing to learn the law by seeing how courts apply it in

actual cases will quickly become frustrated. The Internet has become
a routine part of life for over a hundred million Americans,9 ' but
those who wish to learn the laws that govern Internet surveillance
have few options but to work their way through the raw statutory
text, term-of-art by term-of-art.92 Few cases explain what the
complicated words mean in relatively clear language that a lawyer or
law student can readily understand.

A few Westlaw queries reveal the scope of the problem. The
ALLFEDS database contains only forty-six judicial decisions after
1985 that cite any of the electronic surveillance statutes in the same
paragraph that the word "computer" appears.93 Think about that:
forty-six cases in sixteen years. Thirty-four of these cases cite the
Wiretap Act, and twenty-two of them cite the Stored
Communications Act while ten cases cite both. 94 None of the cases
cite the Pen Register statute. Admittedly, my methodology is highly
unscientific.

I do not doubt that several relevant cases have fallen

beyond this query, and that the result of the query includes many
90. Some answers derive from contemporary understandings of communications
technology at the time the text became law. Other answers can be explained by
distinctions drawn by long-forgotten judicial opinions. I explain the difference between
"pen registers" and "trap and trace devices" (as well as the historical reason for their
unusual names) and historical development in Kerr, supra note 30, at 632-33. The
difference between remote computing service and electronic communications service, and
between wire communications and electronic communications, is explained in the CCIPS
Manual, supra note 3, ch. 4. The exception in definition of "device", sometimes known as
the extension telephone exception to the Wiretap Act, traces back to a 1957 Supreme
Court decision interpreting the 1934 Communications Act. Rathbun v. United States, 355
U.S. 107 (1957). In Rathbun, Chief Justice Warren held that the Communications Act
allowed the use of "extension telephones." Id. at 110. Congress carved out an exception
to the definition of "device" to create consistency between the Wiretap Act and the
Communications Act it replaced.
91. Pew Research Center, Internet Activities at http://www.pewinternet.org/
reports/chart.asp?img=InternetActivities.jpg (last visited March 25, 2003).
92. Although I am hardly unbiased in making such a recommendation, I believe that a
notable exception is the CCIPS Manual, supra note 3.
93. I ran the following search on October 5, 2002 in the Westlaw ALLFEDS database:
"18 U.S.C." /2(2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2518 2520 2701 2702 2703 2704 2705
2706 2707 2708 2711 3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3 127 )/p computer & DA(AFT 1985).
94. This result was based on the results from the search in the footnote above.
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cases that merely cite the statutes but do not actually apply them.9
But the general point survives. In the more than fifteen years since
Congress enacted the modern Internet surveillance laws, only a
trickle of cases have emerged that shed light on any part of them.
Why? The blame lies squarely with the remedies scheme that
Congress has chosen to enforce the surveillance laws. Because
Congress has not provided a statutory suppression remedy, criminal
defendants have little incentive to raise challenges to the
government's Internet surveillance practices.
Absent defense
challenges, courts rarely encounter disputes alleging violations of
those laws, and few decisions result. We can see the difference by
comparing the number of cases after 1985 that cite the Wiretap Act in
the same paragraph that the word "computer" appears with cases that
cite the Act in the same paragraph as the word "telephone" (recall
that the Wiretap Act contains a suppression remedy in the telephone
context).
In the former, only thirty-two cases in Westlaw's
ALLFEDS database qualify; in the latter, 908 cases do.96 While this

may reflect the greater number of telephone wiretaps than Internet
wiretaps, at least in part, a comparison of the number of cases that
cite the Wiretap Act (which offers a suppression remedy in some
contexts) and the Pen Register statute (which does not) reveals a
similar trend. Altogether, 1,498 cases in the ALLFEDS database
have cited the Wiretap Act since January 1, 1986; 9' in the same time,
only forty cases have cited the Pen Register statute. 98 In other words,
cases citing the Wiretap Act outnumber those citing the Pen Register
statute by a ratio of about forty to one. This disparity exists despite
the fact that in most criminal investigations, the number of pen
register orders the government obtains usually outnumbers the
number of wiretap orders by a factor of about ten to one.
Thanks to the lack of a statutory suppression remedy, few
defendants bother to challenge the government's Internet
surveillance practices. When defendants raise these challenges, the
courts generally reject them without reaching the merits on the
ground that no suppression remedy exists. Exceptions do exist. On
95. And of course, a citation that appears in the same paragraph as the word
"computer" does not mean that the case concerns the substance of the statutes. Although
this categorization is necessarily subjective, I would estimate that only about half of those
opinions, roughly twenty in all, offer any interpretation (however brief) of how the
surveillance statutes apply to computers and the Internet.
96. I ran the following query in the ALLFEDS database on October 5, 2002: "18
U.S.C." /2 (2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2518 2520) /p computer & DA(AFT
1985), and then the same with "telephone" replacing "computer."
97. I ran the following query in the ALLFEDS database on October 5, 2002: "18
U.S.C." /2 (2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2518 2520) & DA(AFT 1985).
98. I found this by running the same search as above, but with the sections of Title 18
that make up the Pen Register statute substituted for the Wiretap Act sections.
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rare occasions, a court will nonetheless touch on the merits of
defendant's claims. For example, in United States v. Kennedy,99 a
defendant challenged the government's failure to comply with the
statutory requirement of including "specific and articulable facts" in
an application for a court order to compel an ISP to divulge
information pursuant to section 2703(d) of the Stored
Communications Act. The information had allowed the government
to connect the defendant to reports of child pornography, which led
to a search warrant executed at the defendant's home, which led to
the discovery of child pornography on the defendant's home
computer. The court agreed with the defendant, concluding that the
government's application did not supply a sufficient factual basis; but
then ruled against the defendant on the ground that suppression was
unavailable as a remedy."° Finding no constitutional defect in the
warrant itself, the court ruled against the defendant and allowed the
evidence to be used against him.'
Although the Kennedy court rejected the defendant's
suppression argument, the case is unusual because the defendant was
willing to raise a statutory surveillance argument, and the court was
willing to evaluate it on the merits. '
In most criminal cases,
defendants will not raise such arguments, and the question of whether
the government's investigation complied with Congress's rules will
remain unanswered.
B.

Legal Questions That Remain Unanswered

I have focused so far on how the absence of a suppression
remedy in the Internet surveillance statutes has led to few legal
decisions interpreting the statutes, which in turn has made it difficult
for courts, lawyers, and law students to make sense of the laws
without wading through difficult statutory text. My concern has been
99. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000).
100. Ironically, the government in the Kennedy case did not need to get a 2703(d) order
at all-the government was merely requesting to know the identity of the relevant
subscriber, which it could have obtained with a subpoena pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
2703(c)(1)(C) (1996).
101. See id.
102. Another rare case in which this occurred (or at least something similar to it) is
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). In Scarfo, the defendant tried to
argue that the government's failure to comply with the Wiretap Act in the course of
installing a monitoring device in his home computer should have led to suppression of the
evidence obtained through the monitoring. Id. Making much ado of a fairly simple legal
problem, the Court held on the merits that the Government's monitoring device had not
violated the Wiretap Act. Id. at 582. For a 1940s era version of the Scarfo case, see
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (rejecting a similar argument under
the predecessor to the Wiretap Act following the installation of a monitoring device called
a "detectaphone").
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with the difficulty of finding the existing answers and understanding
the decisions Congress clearly made. This same dynamic has
produced a related effect, however. By shielding routine investigative
steps from judicial review in the context of suppression hearings,
Congress has made it difficult for the courts to resolve major disputes
over the interpretation of the Internet surveillance statutes. Whereas
the courts would normally provide a forum to interpret and clarify
Congress's handiwork, the current remedies scheme has largely
limited the judicial role to reviewing applications for court orders
during investigations, rather than evaluating the laws in written
opinions after criminal charges have been filed.
(1) The Scope of the Pen Register Statute Before the USA PATRIOT Act
The uncertainty over the scope of the Pen Register statute before
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 provides a
helpful illustration of the problem. Before the PATRIOT Act, the
text of the Pen Register statute did not clearly state whether it also
applied to computer communications and the Internet.' °3 The stakes
were significant. If the Pen Register statute did not apply to
computers and the Internet, then anyone could wiretap the Internet
without any court order or judicial review whatsoever, so long as the
wiretap filtered out the "contents" of communications." At the same
time, the government would need a search warrant based on probable
cause to compel an ISP to conduct such monitoring on its behalf. If
the Pen Register statute did apply to the Internet, however, then such
surveillance was a federal crime, but the government could obtain a
pen register order under a very low threshold (much lower than a
search warrant standard) that could compel the ISP to conduct
monitoring for the government.0 '
So did the Pen Register statute apply to the Internet? The
Justice Department believed it did, and its lawyers regularly applied
for pen register orders to conduct Internet surveillance, which
magistrate judges regularly signed."° But because no suppression
remedy existed for violations of the Pen Register statute, no criminal
defendants ever challenged this practice, and no Article III judge ever
had the opportunity to decide whether the statute applied to the
Internet. Obtaining pen register orders became an important and
established part of the government's Internet surveillance practices,
but the only judges to evaluate the practices were the magistrate
judges who either agreed with the government and signed the orders
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Kerr, supra note 30, at 632-36.
See id. at 634.
See id.
See id.
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or disagreed with the government and refused.1 17 No published
decisions existed to help explain the scope of the statute. Until
Congress clarified that the statute did apply to the Internet as part of
the USA PATRIOT Act, the question remained uncertain.
(2) The Wiretap Act and the "Party to the Communication" Exception

Current uncertainty over how the Wiretap Act's "party to the
communication" exception applies to computer networks provides
another helpful example.0 The Wiretap Act was designed to apply
to the telephone network, and prohibits the use of a device to
intercept a communication sent between two parties."° If Bob speaks
on the phone to Mary, third-party Joe cannot tap the line using a
wiretapping device and listen in. However, the Wiretap Act contains
an exception that allows any "party to the communication" to wiretap
the line, or to consent to others doing so."0 The key question is, who
is a party to the communication? The answer is critical because a
party can wiretap the communication and a non-party ordinarily
cannot. In the telephone context, the availability of a suppression
remedy has led to many cases that together draw a relatively clear
rule that a party to the communication is the human being on the end
of the line."1 In the case of the phone call between Bob and Mary,
both Bob and Mary are parties to the communication; Joe is not.
How the party to the communication exception applies to the
Internet has tremendous importance for Internet surveillance law. As
explained earlier, the Internet works on a principle of communal
sharing of information: a computer user might send a command to
computer A, asking computer A to route a command though
computer B and deliver it to computer C. The question is, who (other
than the user) is a party to the communication? Is A a party to the
communication between it and the user? Is C a party? How about
B? These questions are vitally important, but no one really knows
the answers. The courts have not had the opportunity to answer these
107. Two unpublished magistrate decisions were decided in 2000 that evaluated the
question. See Kerr, supra note 30, at 634-35. In one case in the Central District of
California, an ISP challenged the government's order, and the magistrate judge agreed
with the government that the statute applied to the Internet. In another case in the
Northern District of California, a magistrate judge received an application and disagreed
with the government, writing an opinion in the ex parte matter explaining that she did not
believe the statute applied to the Internet. Id. at 635.
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (1993 & Supp. 2002).
109. See id. § 2511.
110. See id. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (Supp. 2002).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that government informant on the line was a party to the communication); United States
v. Gallo, 659 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1981) (police officer answering the phone during the
execution of a warrant was a party to the communication).
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questions in any depth. In the very early case of United States v.
Seidlitz,"2 a computer hacker argued that the owners of the computer
he hacked had violated the Wiretap Act when they recorded the
hacker's unauthorized commands sent to the hacked computer. The
Fourth Circuit rejected the claim first on the ground that the Wiretap
Act did not apply to computers (which was true at that time, several
years before ECPA)."3 Then, in dicta, the Court added that the
hacker's claim could also fail because the victim computer was "for all
intents and purposes a party to the communication.""' 4 Similarly, in
United States v. Mullins,"5 a user of an American Airlines computer
network argued that the airline violated the Wiretap Act by recording
the unauthorized travel arrangements he had made using the
network. The Court quickly rejected the argument on several
grounds, among them the unexplained conclusion that "one of the
parties to the communication (viz., American [Airlines] ... ) had
consented to the monitoring.'' 6
That's it, however."' Together, Seidlitz and Mullins suggest that
the victim of a hacker's commands is probably a party that can record
the hacker's attack, but whether this is true and to what extent
actually remains quite unclear. Because a criminal defendant cannot
move for suppression of the evidence on the basis of a Wiretap Act
violation, the courts have faced few opportunities to apply the
telephone's legal framework to the Internet in criminal cases. As a
result, a very basic question that underlies how the Wiretap Act
applies to the Internet remains largely unknown. Congress can
always step in and clarify the law, as Congress did in part when it
passed the USA PATRIOT Act, but under the current remedies
scheme courts have had few opportunities to develop and clarify the
law. 18
112. 589 F.2d 152, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 157.
114. Id. at 158.
115. 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).
116. Id.
117. One possible exception is In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp.
2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), discussed at length below.
118. One interesting implication of this dynamic is that there are some parts of ECPA
that exist on the books but have little or no effect whatsoever, and seem unlikely to ever
receive any judicial attention (or legislative repeal). The most obvious example of this is
18 U.S.C. § 2704 (2002), which is entitled Backup Preservation. Section 2704 is part of the
original 1986 Act, and offers a complex procedure in which the government can order an
ISP to make a backup of a communication to preserve the communications. The section
was made largely redundant by the later addition of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2002), which
requires ISPs to take "all necessary steps" to preserve evidence when contacted by law
enforcement and informed that a court order for the evidence is being sought. As a result
of advances in both the law and technology, section 2704 no longer serves any purpose,
and is never used.
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The Distorting Effects of Civil Precedents

The law's current focus on civil remedies has produced a third
unfortunate effect on the development of Internet surveillance law:
the emergence of civil precedents that misconstrue the surveillance
laws almost beyond recognition, and end up making the law more
confusing, not less.
(1) How Civil Cases Can Distort CriminalStatutes

It is not hard to see why the current remedies scheme encourages
the filing of civil lawsuits that stretch the boundaries of the electronic
surveillance statutes. The promise of attorney's fees and the
possibility of punitive damages, combined with the added bonus of a
federal question to allow the suit to be filed in federal court, creates a
strong incentive for potential plaintiffs to push the boundaries of Title
III and ECPA in civil cases. As a result, about seventy percent of the
cases in the Westlaw ALLFEDS database that cite the surveillance
statutes in cases involving computers are civil cases. Most of these
suits do not involve the government at all: rather, they involve claims
that a private party invaded the plaintiff's Internet privacy, and that
the invasion of privacy should be considered a "wiretap" or a
violation of the Stored Communications Act.
In the abstract, whether a case appears on the criminal or civil
side of a court's docket may seem irrelevant to how the court resolves
the legal issue. The law is the law, and the statutory text is the
statutory text. However, the dramatically different context of the two
types of cases inevitably pulls at how courts interpret the laws.
Consider the forces at play when a criminal defendant challenges the
government's surveillance practices in a motion to suppress. Courts
naturally will interpret the statutes in light of the necessary balance
between a defendant's civil liberties on one hand and the
government's need to solve crimes on the other. If a court construes
the statutes too narrowly, it may infringe upon the defendant's civil
liberties (and by implication, our own); if the court construes the
surveillance statutes too broadly, it may unduly restrict law
enforcement's ability to protect public safety.
The stakes are quite different in a typical civil case between
private parties. In a civil case, plaintiff A will come forward alleging a
violation of his Internet privacy by the defendant B. The case may
have nothing whatsoever do to with criminal law. Instead, party A
will claim that party B did something that infringed on party A's
privacy interests, and that party B should have to pay, at least in part.
Courts naturally will interpret the applicable law in light of the
normative question of which party should bear the costs of the harm
and in what proportion. If the court construes the statute too
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narrowly, it may force A to bear the costs of B's harmful conduct. If
the court construes the statute too broadly, it may force B to bear
costs better borne by A. Either way, when the court tries to strike
that balance, the court will view the case through the lens of tort law
rather than criminal law.
These differences assume tremendous importance when a court
must resolve a civil dispute based on the predominantly criminal
Internet surveillance laws. Owing to the near-total absence of
criminal precedents interpreting these statutes, a court often will have
little sense of how its decision fits within the context of criminal cases,
or even that the decision will have any implications at all for criminal
law. The court will try to wade through the inscrutable statutory text
of ECPA and Title III guided by an intuitive need to distribute costs
properly between the private parties, with little sense of how its
decision will affect the world of criminal law and law enforcement
surveillance practices.
When the resulting civil precedents are
applied in a criminal context, however, the decisions can have
surprising and disturbing implications for routine criminal
investigations.
(2) In re Doubleclick Privacy Litigation

Consider the recent civil litigation over Doubleclick, an Internet
advertising service." 9 Doubleclick's service worked by placing a
"cookie" on Internet user's computers that contained information
about other websites that the computer had been used to visit within
a network of companies that used Doubleclick's service. When a user
browsed the web and visit different sites that were Doubleclick
customers, Doubleclick's server sent the computer targeted
advertising based on the other sites that the user had visited. 0 A
casual user would not know that his computer was communicating
with Doubleclick's server as the process was mostly invisible to the
user.
In theory, this approach allowed Doubleclick to target
advertising, allowing companies wishing to advertise to reach
interested customers more easily (and allowing Doubleclick to make
a buck in the process).
But plaintiffs' lawyers weren't far behind. Seeking attorney's
fees and punitive damages, plaintiffs' lawyers pounced on the case,
suing Doubleclick in various federal districts for violating the Wiretap
Act and the Stored Communications Act, among other laws. The
cases were consolidated as a single massive class action in the
Southern District of New York, and brought on behalf of all Internet

119. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
120. See id. at 500-05.
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users who had Doubleclick cookies placed on their computers.1 2' The
plaintiffs' theory was that by placing cookies on the plaintiffs
computer and sending communications to and from the computers
behind the scenes, Doubleclick had both accessed the computers of
communications providers without authorization, thereby obtaining
communications in electronic storage in violation of the Stored
Communications Act, and wiretapping the users' computers in
violation of the Wiretap Act.'22
Both of these claims were quite ridiculous. Recall that the
Stored Communications Act regulates the privacy of Internet account
holders at ISPs and other servers; the law was enacted to create by
statute a set of Fourth Amendment-like set of rights in stored records
held by ISPs. 123 The theory of the Doubleclick plaintiffs turned this
framework on its head, as it attempted to apply a law designed to give
account holders privacy rights in information held at third-party ISPs
to home PCs interacting with websites. In the language of the
client/server network model, the plaintiffs tried to harness a law
designed to give clients rights in communications held by their server
by recasting the clients as servers and the websites they visited as the
clients. The plaintiffs then wanted the Act to give servers privacy
rights against invasions of privacy by their clients, rather than vice
versa.
The plaintiffs' Wiretap Act claims were only slightly less absurd.
As explained earlier, the Wiretap Act prohibits a third-party from
intercepting in real-time the contents of communications between two
parties unless one of the two parties consents. This law had no
applicability to Doubleclick's cookies, as the cookies did not intercept
any contents and did not intercept anything in real-time. The cookies
merely registered data sent to it from Doubleclick's servers. As the
plaintiffs construed the Wiretap Act, however, the cookies were
"wiretaps" that intercepted their users communications just like a
telephone wiretap.
Faced with the plaintiffs' civil complaint and Doubleclick's
motion to dismiss, however, the District Court accepted the basic
framework offered by the plaintiffs (although it did find exceptions in
Most
the laws that allowed it to rule in favor of the defendants).
importantly, the court agreed with the plaintiffs' patently absurd
argument that home PC users were "providers" regulated by the
Stored Communications Act, and that the Act gave "providers"

121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 500.
See id. at 501.
See S. REP. No. 99-541, (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 509-14.
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privacy rights against "users," in this case websites"' This is
something like going into court and deciding that the judge is the
plaintiff, the jurors are the defendant, and that the question is
whether the bailiff has to pay damages to the court clerk. It's hard to
imagine a court reaching such a result in a criminal case. The Act
allows the government to obtain court orders compelling providers to
disclose records about their users,"6 and no prosecutor would obtain a
court order compelling a home personal computer to disclose records
about a website. Similarly, in the case of the Wiretap Act claims, the
defendant conceded the incorrect assertion that the cookie was a
wiretap for the purposes of its motion,' 2' and argued only that the
cookie did not violate the wiretap act because Doubleclick's server
was a "user" and therefore a "party to the communication," which the
Court agreed it was.' Again, it's difficult to imagine a criminal court
applying such a framework in a criminal case: any prosecutor who
works with wiretaps would know that a cookie simply does not
effectuate a wiretap.
Unable to find any criminal precedents directly on point,
however, and unaware of how its decision would apply in a criminal
context, the district court agreed with the bizarre framework offered
by the civil lawyers in the case. The result was an opinion on the
books that misinterprets the Internet surveillance laws pretty much
from start to finish, with hardly a single correct assertion of law. 9
And yet given the near total absence of cases interpreting the
statutes, the Doubleclick opinion stands as one of the few published
precedents on how the surveillance laws apply to the Internet. In
fact, in the year and a half since the case appeared, no less than five
law school casebooks on Internet law and privacy law have already
featured the Doubleclick case as a leading case to explain Internet
125. See id. at 510.
126. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (Supp. 2002).
127. See In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514 ("For the purposes of this motion,
DoubleClick concedes that its conduct, as pled, violates this prohibition [in the Wiretap
Act]. However, DoubleClick claims that its actions fall under an explicit statutory
exception....").
128. See id.
129. Ironically, the Court did make one correct conclusion of law, although under a
quite bizarre rationale. The Court properly concluded that the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. §
2701 applies only to the access of communications in "electronic storage," which is defined
to mean temporary intermediate storage pending delivery, such as an e-mail that has not
yet been delivered. Id. at 512. To reach this result, however, the court relied heavily on a
House Report and text relating to a bill from the year 2000 that was proposed but never
passed that contained language purporting to explain the meaning of "electronic storage."
See id. (quoting H.R REP. No. 106-932 (2000)). Reliance on legislative history is one
thing, but reliance on the legislative history of a bill that was proposed but never passed
fifteen years after the passage of the legislation at issue was enacted seems quite another.
On this one question, however, it so happened that the court's result was correct.
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surveillance law. 130 The hallucinogenic interpretations of the statutes
in Doubleclick have been treated as important precedents among
lawyers and law students eager to understand the mysteries of the
Internet surveillance laws.
(3) Konop v. HawaiianAirlines

The Ninth Circuit's initial decision in Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines131 (Konop I) offers a second example of how courts can
dramatically misconstrue the Internet surveillance laws in civil cases.
Robert Konop was a Hawaiian Airlines pilot who maintained a
password-protected website which contained his workplace
grievances.132
Konop provided usernames to specific airline
employees, who could then log on to the site, obtain a password, and
then access the password-protected portions of the site to view
Konop's opinions on the airline and its union.'33

Davis, a vice-

president of the airline, caught wind of the site and obtained
permission from an employee who was assigned a username (but had
not himself obtained a password) to log on to the site with the
employee's username to view Konop's materials. 3 When Konop
learned that Davis had viewed the website, Konop sued the airline in
federal court, alleging-you guessed it-violations of the Wiretap Act
and the Stored Communications Act.
Both of Konop's claims should have been swiftly rejected. The
Wiretap Act arguments lacked merit because the Act addresses only
prospective, real-time surveillance, the statutory embodiment of the
Fourth Amendment principles developed by the Supreme Court in
the real-time wiretapping case of Berger v. New York. 36 Under the
trio of surveillance laws, access to stored communications such as web
files is governed if it all by the Stored Communications Act, not the
Wiretap Act.'37 Konop's Stored Communications Act claim should

have failed as well. Konop sued under a provision that only prohibits
130. See RAYMOND KU ET AL., CYBERSPACE LAW; CASES AND MATERIALS 559-67
(2002); RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 140-48 (2002);
DANIEL SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, 493-503 (2002);
MADELEINE SCHACTER, THE LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 434-45 (2002); MADELEINE
SCHACTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY (2002).
131. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001), modified,
302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
132. See Konop, 236 F.3d at 1042.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Konop also alleged violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(2002), but those arguments are not relevant here. Id. at 1048.
136. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
137. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th
Cir. 1994).
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unauthorized access to files stored incident to transmission in a user's
account held by a service provider,' such as undelivered, unopened
e-mail held by an ISP. Web files held by a web server waiting to be
sent to whoever accesses a web page cannot satisfy this threshold
showing: in the language of the act, web page files are not files in
through which an
temporary "electronic storage"'39 held by "a facility
1 40
electronic communication service is provided.
But the Ninth Circuit would have none of this. Showing the
judicial independence that has made the Ninth Circuit famous (or
infamous, depending on your point of view), the court managed to
fashion a remedy for the sympathetic plaintiff-employee against his
overly intrusive defendant-employer on both the Wiretap Act and the
Stored Communications Act claims. Rejecting the teachings of a
dozen or so courts (including the Ninth Circuit itself141) in favor of two
student law review notes and hints of broad commitments to
protecting privacy found in the legislative history, the Court held that
the Wiretap Act did apply to stored Internet communications. 2 The
Court was influenced in large part by the fact that it could find no
statute that governed access to stored communications: Congress
must have intended that the Wiretap Act would protect stored
communications, the court reasoned, because it did not protect them
elsewhere. 43 Because it seemed arbitrary and irrational to protect
communications in transit but not stored communications, the Court
concluded that the Wiretap Act applied to access to stored
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (Supp. 2002).
139. Id. The term "electronic storage" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) as "(A) any
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication."
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1).
141. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. See id. at 1046 (citing Tatsuya Akamine, Proposal for a Fair Statutory
Interpretation: E-Mail Stored in a Service Provider Computer Is Subject to an Interception
Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 519, 550-51 (1999); Thomas Greenberg, EMail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 219,248-49 (1994)).
143. See Konop, 236 F.3d at 1045:
[W]here Congress has provided lesser protection for electronic communications,
it has done so straightforwardly, and for discernable reasons.... No similarly
straightforward provision of the Wiretap Act affords stored electronic
communications a lesser degree of protection from interception than stored wire
communications. We know of no reason why Congress might have wished to do
so. An electronic communication in storage is no more or less private than an
electronic communication in transmission.
Id. As the Court later recognized, this statement overlooked the Stored Communications
Act entirely.

April 2003]

SUPPRESSION REMEDY FOR COMPUTER CRIMES

835

communications and that Davis had violated the Wiretap Act by

viewing Konop's website. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling
to the contrary, noting in passing that its reversal on the Wiretap Act
claim also required reversal on the Stored Communications Act
claim, which the court viewed as merely a "lesser included offense" of
the Wiretap Act claims.'44

Whatever the merits of Konop I from the standpoint of
employer-employee relations,
the decision would have had
potentially disastrous implications for Internet crime investigations
had it stayed on the books.'45 The trouble is that the Stored
Communications Act already governed access to stored
communications, as its title suggests. Subjecting every kind of access
to the "super search warrant" requirement of the Wiretap Act would
have nullified the Stored Communication Act entirely, and brought
many if not most Internet crime investigations to a standstill because
nearly every step of an investigation would require the government to
obtain a "super search warrant" wiretap order.' 6 Understood as a
whole, the Internet surveillance laws clearly did not contemplate this.

At the time of Konop I, however, the Ninth Circuit simply did
not understand how Konop's claim fit within the broader context of
the law. It construed the case through the lens of worker privacy, not
the rules that govern criminal investigations. It was only when the

implications of Konop I for criminal law reached the panel through
amicus briefs filed by federal and state law enforcement interests in
favor of the Airlines' petition for rehearing that the panel realized its
error. 47 The panel eventually withdrew its initial decision, and a year
144. See id. at 1048.
The Konop Court's strange notion that the Stored
Communications Act provided a "lesser included offense" of the Wiretap Act derived
from a misreading of the Stored Communications Act in obiter dictum by a prior Ninth
Circuit panel in Smith. 155 F.3d at 1051. In that case, under the guise of a textualist
reading of the intersection of the Stored Communications Act and the Wiretap Act, Judge
O'Scannlain invented from whole cloth a novel theory that the former was a "lesser
included offense" of the latter, and that the Stored Communications Act really had
nothing to do with stored communications at all. Id. at 1058. Congress corrected this
error, rejected Smith, and clarified the line between the Wiretap Act and Stored
Communications Act when it passed the USA PATRIOT Act in October, 2001. As the
Konop II panel recognized, the PATRIOT Act rejected the statutory basis for this "lesser
included offense" theory. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d at 878 ("By
eliminating storage from the definition of wire communication, Congress essentially
reinstated the pre-ECPA definition of intercept-acquisition contemporaneous with
transmission-with respect to wire communications.") (citations omitted).
145. See Caitlin Liu, Reversal of Internet Ruling Is Sought: U.S. and Local Prosecutors
Tell Appeals Court That Curbs on Web Site and E-Mail Access Make Their Job Harder,
L.A. TIMES, April 23,2001, at B1.
146. Id.
147. I co-authored one of the amicus briefs on behalf of the Justice Department along
with Mark Eckenwiler of the DOJ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section.
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later issued a second decision (Konop II) that agreed that the
Wiretap Act did not apply to stored communications.14 Even in
Konop II, however, the Court adhered to its view (implied in Konop
I) that the Airlines vice-president had violated the Stored
Communications Act.'49 Just like the defendants in the Doubleclick
case wrongly conceded that the Wiretap Act applied, the defendant in
Konop had wrongly conceded that the Stored Communications Act
applied,5 ° and based its argument solely on the application of an
exception that the Konop H court ultimately rejected.'
In both Konop I and Doubleclick, courts faced civil disputes
litigated by civil lawyers involving criminal statutes for which few
criminal precedents existed. The courts did their best in light of what
they knew. But faced with the fog of Internet surveillance law and
the complex maze of statutes involved, both courts dramatically
misconstrued the applicable law. Without any sense of how their
decisions would apply in a criminal context, both courts erred in
major ways that they could not envision. The statutes lacked a
suppression remedy which would have filled the books with criminal
cases settling key issues in a criminal context. As a result, courts
forced to venture into this area in a civil context had little guidance to
follow and produced results that confused rather than clarified the
law.
III. Lifting the Fog of Internet Surveillance: A Proposal to
Add a Statutory Suppression Remedy to the Internet
Surveillance Laws
Internet surveillance law remains a fog, and the remedies scheme
deserves much of the blame. What can Congress do to change this?
In this section, I offer a proposal for Congress to enact a statutory
suppression remedy for violations of the Internet surveillance
statutes. To be more accurate, I offer a range of proposals. There are
several ways in which Congress could enact a suppression remedy,
and although I have a few preferences, I am ambivalent as to which
approach would be best. After introducing the proposal, I offer

148. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 878.
149. See id. at 880.
150. See id. at 879-80.
The parties agree that the relevant "electronic communications service" is
Konop's website, and that the website was in "electronic storage." In addition,
for the purposes of this opinion, we accept the parties' assumption that Davis'
conduct constituted "access without authorization to a facility through which an

electronic communication service is provided."
Id.
151. See id.
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arguments in its favor addressed to two important constituencies that
exert a significant influence over Congress in this area: civil liberties
groups, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology152 and the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, 53 on one hand, and the Justice
Department on the other. While it may seem unorthodox to frame
arguments with these two groups explicitly in mind, few changes in
the Internet surveillance statutes can pass through Congress without
at least the support of one of these sides and the grudging
acquiescence of the other.
A. A Proposal to Add a Suppression Remedy to the Internet Surveillance
Laws

The core of my proposal is to make violations of the Internet
surveillance statutes grounds for suppression of evidence in criminal
cases. As I detail further below, such a change would create a strong
incentive for defendants to challenge the government's surveillance
practices in court. In so doing, it would create a forum for the courts
to apply the statutes in criminal cases, which would clarify both to the
government and the public what powers the government can exercise
to investigate Internet crime, as well as the limits on those powers.
Two difficult and interrelated questions confront any effort to
add a suppression remedy to the Internet surveillance statutes. The
first question is, how broadly should the remedy extend? Congress
could add a suppression remedy limited to violations of the Wiretap
Act only, mirroring the current law of telephone surveillance.
Congress could opt for a slightly broader approach, and limit the
suppression remedy to statutory violations that involve the
acquisition of contents (covering violations of the Wiretap Act and
Section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act). On another axis,
Congress could model the suppression remedy after the Fourth
Amendment, and limit it to violations of the law by the government,
rather than allowing the rule to encompass the suppression of
evidence obtained by private parties in violation of the surveillance
laws. I"4 Finally, Congress could embrace a broad rule that extends the
152. http://www.cdt.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
153. http://www.epic.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
154. The Wiretap Act's suppression remedy applies to communications wrongfully
intercepted by both the government and private parties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i)
(1993) (stating that an aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of wire and
oral communications when "the communication was unlawfully intercepted."); United
States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987).
The Sixth Circuit has carved out a "clean hands" exception to this rule that reads by
judicial construction what Congress quite plainly rejected, a Fourth-Amendment-like rule
that the suppression rule does not apply when "the government played no part in the
unlawful interception." United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995). The
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suppression remedy to any violation either by the government or a
private party of any of the surveillance statutes, both in the case of
content and non-content information.
The second and related question considers whether to combine
the suppression remedy with deferential doctrines to limit instances
of suppression while nonetheless allowing the court to apply the law
to the facts. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contains a host of
such doctrines. For example, under the good faith exception
announced in United States v. Leon,'55 a court will not suppress
evidence "seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search
warrant that is subsequently held to be defective."'' 6 Similarly, under
the inevitable discovery doctrine announced in Nix v. Williams,'57
courts will not suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment if the police can "establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means."'58 Finally, under the apparent
authority doctrine announced in Illinois v. Rodriguez,'58 courts will
not suppress evidence obtained in reliance on the consent of a third
party to a search, even if the third party did not have the authority to
consent, if based on "the facts available to the officer at the
moment.., a man of reasonable caution [would believe] that the
consenting party had authority"'6" to consent. All three of these
exceptions act as safety valves. They allow the courts to pronounce
the law by applying it to the facts, but then avoid suppression of
evidence unless the violation is particularly clear or egregious.
Any statutory suppression remedy for violations of the Internet
surveillance laws would have to address both sets of these questions.
Consider the current telephone surveillance law. The law extends the
suppression remedy only to violations of the Wiretap Act, not the Pen
Court reasoned that punishing the government for the illegal act of a private citizen makes
little sense, in part because it would not deter government misconduct. Id. This is clearly
Congress' decision to make, however, and Congress chose to expand the suppression
remedy to both private and government acts. See In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 107778 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting Murdock). This is a sensible decision on Congress' part. If the
suppression remedy applies only to government misconduct, a private party can make an
illegal surreptitious interception of another person's phone call, send it in to the police
anonymously, and allow the government to use the evidence against the party whose
communication was illegally intercepted. The Fourth Amendment would allow such a
result under the private search doctrine, see Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110, but Congress
could reasonably conclude that greater privacy protection is required in the context of the
Wiretap Act.
155. 468 U.S. 897.
156. Id. at 905.
157. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
158. Id. at 444.
159. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
160. Id. at 188-89.
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Register statute or Stored Communications Act, and also allows
violations by both state actors and private actors to trigger
suppression.1"1 At the same time, when the government obtains a
will
Title III order that is later proved to be defective,• the court
. 162
suppress the evidence only if the defect was important; mere
technical errors will not trigger suppression.6 3 Notably, all three
surveillance statutes also contain "good faith" defenses stating that
good faith reliance on a "legislative authorization" or "statutory
authorization" provides a complete defense to a civil or criminal

action." These defenses do not appear to apply in the context of a
suppression hearing, however, and in any event cases construing them
have been notably erratic."'

Rather than select one specific proposal for Congress, I will
make two guiding observations instead. First, the answers to the two
questions are necessarily linked. The broader Congress sees fit to
extend the suppression remedy, the more need arises for doctrines to
temper the broad rule. Conversely, if Congress opts for a robust set
of safety valve defenses, it can match that with a broader suppression
rule than otherwise.

Second, I think a well-designed set of safety

valve defenses would likely improve the implementation of a
suppression remedy in the early stages of its existence. For example,
a safety valve modeled after the qualified immunity doctrine would

enforce the suppression rule when the law is clearly violated but not
when the law remains vague.' 66 This would serve the interests of law
enforcement and civil libertarians alike. On one hand, it would
satisfy law enforcement by allowing evidence to be used when the
161. See CCIPS Manual, supranote 3, at ch. 3-4.
162. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974) (limiting suppression to cases
in which defective order "fail[ed] to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that
directly and substantially implement the congressional intention [in enacting Title III] to
limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment
of this extraordinary investigative advice.").
163. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing district
court's suppression order on ground that judge's failure to sign the Title III order in the
correct place was merely a technical defect).
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(d)(1), 3123(e) (1993); 2707(e)(1) (Supp. 2002).
165. See CCIPS Manual, supra note 3, at 177-78 (summarizing cases).
166. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
In general, qualified immunity protects government officials from civil suit when "[t]he
contours of the right" violated were not so clear that a reasonable person would
understand that his conduct violated the law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). When there is a "dearth of law surrounding the... statute" the absence of case
law can help trigger qualified immunity. Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir.
1999) (applying qualified immunity doctrine to the Wiretap Act).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

government's "error" is merely a disagreement with the court over a
difficult question of law. On the other hand, such a rule would
further civil liberties interests in the long run by allowing the courts
to clarify the law for future cases without the pervasive bias of
suppression influencing the courts to rule in favor of law enforcement
claims.
B.

Why Civil Liberties Groups Should Support the Proposal

The case for why civil liberties groups should support my
proposal is an easy one to make. Adding a suppression remedy to the
Internet surveillance laws has been a goal among civil liberties groups
since the laws were passed in 1986.
For the most part, the civil
liberties argument has been framed for the public in terms of the
enforceability of the surveillance laws. By adding a suppression
remedy, the argument runs, law enforcement will finally have a
reason to comply with the law. The remedy will give the law a muchneeded "bite." ' 68

Beyond enforceability, however, the addition of a statutory
suppression remedy would have other major benefits from the
standpoint of civil liberties. First and foremost, the change would
finally expose the government's Internet surveillance practices to
judicial scrutiny, and as a result, to public scrutiny. The suppression
remedy would lift the "fog" of Internet surveillance, as defendants
would bring challenges to the government's practices in court, and
judges would be required to resolve whether the government's
practices complied with the laws Congress passed to regulate it.
Those resolutions would form part of the public record, creating a
body of judicial precedents available to the public explaining exactly
what the government can and can't do. Where the laws grant the
government substantial powers, courts would decide cases saying so,
creating a public record of the government's power which could
provide a catalyst for legislative change curtailing the government's
powers.
On a related note, a suppression remedy would expose and focus
attention on specific .instances in which the government may have
violated the rules. Under current law, the government's Internet
surveillance practices rarely become public, stoking fears of
government abuse. A suppression remedy would restore a sense of
167. See, e.g., The Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. 25 (2002)
(statement of James X. Dempsey, recommending that Congress add electronic
communications to the Title III exclusionary rule in 18 U.S.C. § 2515 and add a similar
rule to the § 2703 authority), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/demp0406.htm.
168. See Leib, supra note 11.
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accountability to the government's Internet surveillance practices and
replace general anxiety about Big Brother online with a more focused
attention on actual instances of misconduct.
C.

Why the Justice Department Should Support the Proposal

Convincing the Justice Department to support a proposal adding
a suppression remedy is the tougher challenge. After all, the DOJ
successfully fought off such a remedy in 1986.169 Why would DOJ

want to make life harder for its prosecutors, giving defense attorneys
a new tool to try to have evidence thrown out in court, potentially
resulting in the loss of important criminal cases and the resulting
harm to public safety? This section argues that DOJ should want just
such a rule, at least when tempered by safety valves such as good faith
defenses that will minimize actual instance of suppression when
violations of rules are merely technical or hinge on debatable
questions of law.
DOJ should want such a rule for several reasons. First, judicial
clarification of the law would serve DOJ's interests. As the Supreme
Court has noted in the Fourth Amendment context, law enforcement
works best when the government law provides clear and readily
administrable rules for the government to follow.17 °

Under the

current remedies regime, the lack of clarity in the law may exert a
chilling effect on investigative practices. Faced with legal uncertainty
and little prospect of judicial clarification, the government may adopt
interpretations of the law internally that are significantly more
restrictive than a court would allow. If courts began to step in and
draw clear boundaries, however, the existence of clear lines would
free law enforcement to confidently exercise its powers within the
boundaries drawn by the courts.
Second, the addition of a suppression remedy would give DOJ a
considerable amount of control over the forum and context of the
surveillance disputes the courts resolve, as well as the arguments the
courts hear. Currently, the courts encounter Internet surveillance
disputes mostly in civil cases between private parties, such as
Doubleclick and Konop. DOJ ordinarily does not know about such
169. See Leib, supranote 11.
170. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the
heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of
reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied
with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after
an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth
Amendment balance thus credit the government's side with an essential interest
in readily administrable rules.
Id. at 347.
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disputes until the decisions they produce are published, and has no
opportunity to offer its own interpretation of the primarily criminal

laws at issue.
In contrast, DOJ will be a party to every federal
criminal case, and therefore will have a full opportunity to offer its
views on the law. DOJ can also exercise significant control over the
courts' docket in criminal cases. If a case raises difficult surveillance
issues that the DOJ does not want a court to resolve given the facts of
the case, DOJ can either refuse to indict the case, or else can move to
dismiss its indictment or enter into a sweetheart plea agreement to

moot a defense challenge. The fact that a federal prosecutor cannot
appeal an adverse ruling without pre-approval from the Solicitor
General's Office would further add to the effectiveness of DOJ's
control of the docket if a statutory suppression remedy existed.
If a

district court judge ruled against the government and suppressed
evidence

on the

grounds that

the government

violated

the

surveillance laws, attorneys in the Solicitor General's Office would
determine whether it would be in law enforcement's best interests to

seek appellate review (triggering an appellate opinion instead of a
district court order).73
Third, litigating Internet surveillance law in criminal cases would
provide the government with a sympathetic forum in which to press
its arguments. As noted earlier, criminal cases raise different stakes
than civil cases, and courts may be more inclined to rule against

criminal defendants than civil plaintiffs. This dynamic has received
some attention in the scholarship on Fourth Amendment law. Akhil
Amar and others have criticized the exclusionary rule for causing
Fourth Amendment issues to arise primarily in criminal cases, where
171. In the case of Konop, for example, DOJ was unaware of the case until the Ninth
Circuit's published opinion appeared on Westlaw. See Liu, supra note 145, at Bi. At that
point, DOJ was able to file an amicus curiae brief in favor of the Hawaiian Airlines
petition for rehearing. However, if Hawaiian Airlines had opted not to pursue review of
the panel's decision, DOJ would have had no opportunity to intervene in the dispute and
help the courts understand the error of the court's approach in Konop 1.
172. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 766 (2001).
By law, the federal government cannot appeal an adverse decision by a district
court or a circuit court without the approval of the Solicitor General"); 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.20 (2000) ("The following-described matters are assigned to, and shall be
conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solicitor General, in consultation with
each agency or official concerned .... (b) Determining whether, and to what
extent, appeals will be taken by the Government to all appellate courts
(including petitions for rehearing en banc and petitions to such courts for the
issuance of extraordinary writs) and ... (c) Determining whether a brief amicus
curiae will be filed by the Government, or whether the Government will
intervene, in any appellate court.
Id.
173. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2000).
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courts may construe the government's powers broadly to avoid letting
a criminal go free.174 Applying this insight in reverse, the government
should want the rules governing it to be decided by the courts in
criminal cases. By causing questions of Internet surveillance law to
arise in criminal cases, a suppression remedy will result in judicial
resolution of ambiguous laws in a sympathetic context for the
government.
The fourth reason DOJ should want a suppression remedy is that
public understanding of surveillance law would likely lead to more
public support for law enforcement online, rather than less. Today's
press is quite enamored with visions of the government online as an
omnipresent Big Brother. As a result, the media tends to overreport
the amount of power law enforcement has online and tends to
underreport the amount of privacy Internet users enjoy. This
misreporting occurs at least in part because limitations on the
government's power that are acutely felt within the government
remain unknown outside the government. The fog of Internet
surveillance law keeps the press and the public unaware of the
limitations the government faces investigating routine criminal cases.
A suppression remedy would change that. By triggering criminal
cases interpreting the surveillance laws, a suppression remedy would
show the public how the surveillance laws regulate and restrict the
government as it tries to pursue hackers, pedophiles, fraudsters and
terrorists online. Cases construing the government's powers would
reveal the limits of the government's powers, fostering a political
climate more sympathetic to the government's position than the
current one.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
has left Internet surveillance law to develop as a primarily statutory
field. As a result, the rules that regulate the people's government are
174. See, e.g. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L.

REV. 757, 799 (1994) (arguing that judges distort Fourth Amendment doctrine to find no
violation in sympathetic criminal cases); George C. Thomas, III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving
Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147,

168 (1993) ("If the only option when finding a violation is to suppress the evidence, judges
may feel themselves hemmed in by the doctrine and may define the Fourth Amendment
as necessary on a case-by-case basis to permit the use of seized evidence."); David Moran,
The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Carat Any Time, 47

VILL. L. REV. 815, 815 (2002) (noting that "[s]everal commentators have argued that the
exclusionary rule has harmed Fourth Amendment values because judges are more likely
to give the Fourth Amendment a grudging and narrow interpretation when a criminal
defendant seeks to exclude probative evidence of her guilt than when a civil litigant seeks
damages.").
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up to the people and the legislators they elect to represent them. I
think this arrangement has the potential to lead to an optimal set of
rules governing law enforcement, a set of rules far better than those
that would result if the courts alone tried to set up the rules under the
guise of the Fourth Amendment. The public's tremendous interest in
and concern about Internet privacy, combined with its recognition of
the importance of allowing the government to investigate crimes, can
lead to a balanced and thoughtful set of rules that protect both
privacy and public safety.
For the legislative process to work, however, the law must
provide a feedback loop. The law must generate cases that tell
Congress and the public how the law is working in practice. The
feedback loop can then allow Congress and the public to enact
changes that tweak the rules to strike a better balance between
privacy and security. In some cases, the changes will restrict law
enforcement powers; in others, they will expand the powers. In both
cases, however, the feedback loop acts as an essential control on the
legislative process. It guarantees that the laws the people want are
the laws the people get.
By choosing to enforce the laws though civil remedies rather
than an exclusionary rule, Congress has inadvertently cut the
feedback loop of Internet surveillance law. The absence of criminal
cases and existence of a few aberrant civil cases has created a
statutory fog. Few understand how the law works, few understand
the limits of the government's power, and the government itself lacks
clear rules allowing it to exercise its powers. Congress no doubt
meant well when it agreed to limit the remedies to the civil context in
1986. Legislators presumably believed that civil remedies would
ensure that the laws were enforced without punishing the government
with a loss of evidence if a court ruled that the government violated
the rules. This choice has had an unintended consequence, however:
by shielding the government's conduct from judicial scrutiny in
routine criminal cases, the remedies scheme blocked the courts from
being able to explain how the law applied, which both blocked the
law from developing in the courts, and shielded Congress, the press,
and the public from a clear vision of how the laws work in the field.
As Justice Brandeis famously noted, "[s]unlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants."'75 Sixteen years after ECPA passed, it is now
clear that Congress's remedies scheme has served neither the
interests of the DOJ that proposed the scheme, nor the civil
175. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman."), reprinted in THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 158 (Solomon
Goldman ed.. 1953).
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libertarians who opposed it. The law remains in a fog. Congress
should reconsider its 1986 decision and add a statutory suppression
remedy. Shedding light on the surveillance laws will illuminate the
law to everyone's benefit.

